REPORTpost: boston tragedy highlights new trends in terrorism

In the wake of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detonating during the Boston Marathon this past week, major terrorist networks were reticent on responsibility.  Four were murdered by the alleged attackers. 183 have been injured. The triumphs and tragedy of this experience are not unfamiliar in modern America. Occurring during a major public event, the multiple explosions signaled a clear desire of mass causalities and publicity befitting the scale of an international network. Without initial confirmation of the assailants' identities, the American government began a massive public manhunt. Success and security were measured in terms of the ability to execute justice as the government dramatically conducted a multi-day, city-wide manhunt ending in the death of one suspect and the capture of another. 

 Although the official investigation of the alleged crimes and affiliations is in its infancy, it is suspected that these two young men were "lone wolf" terrorists. Their past seems to fit a pattern of "self-radicalization"--a socialization method that results in disaffected individuals seeking out grandiose violent actions against state targets and their citizens. A departure in character from our primary adversaries during the height of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the "lone wolf" profile seems to be more diverse than its SW Asia counterparts. Instead of attending training camps or basement cabals, "lone wolves" and other terrorist affiliates learn their doctrine and skills in relative isolation. Notably, the Boston attackers most likely pursued their indoctrination from the internet, with weapons designs from Al Qaeda's brand of English-language publishing known as Inspire magazine. The publication is devised to aid its readership with their anti-Western radicalization and anti-peace tactics. The magazine featured devices practically identical to those used in Boston.

The Boston attacks arrive in the wake of other less-publicized terrorist incidents. Since 9/11 and excluding Boston, there have been eight instances where a "lone wolf" has murdered citizens for an idealized political effect. This "leaderless resistance" makes penetration and prevention of the attack endlessly challenging. Detection is greatly challenged when one has little interaction to analyze to detect such threats.

The United States GWOT has been effective at destabilizing the structure and personnel of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the past decade. Various leaders and pieces of legislation have expanded government bureaucracy to a degree that intelligence gathering and operations execution are achieving considerable milestones in eliminating enemies abroad. However, those successes will most likely not produce long-term gains, especially for homegrown terrorists. Unlike state actors, terrorist organizations are amorphous and endlessly adaptable. These organizations typically do not have to provide services nor respond to public opinion in order to be viable and remain dangerous to the US and its allies.

The US has to conduct analysis on the best way to combat lone wolf terrorists. Most likely, it will involve more protection of soft targets (malls, schools, events). Given the lack of ability to identify lone persons planning terrorist campaigns, it is up to the federal and state governments to coordinate and innovate on various civilian-protection programs.